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ABSTRACT: The design of inspection schedules is a complex optimization problem that requires the reliabil-
ity to be assessed. The solution to this problem can be found balancing the costs associated to inspection/repair
activities against the benefits related to the faultless operation of the infrastructure. The optimization aims at
minimizing the total cost, obtained as the combination of maintenance and failure costs, by tuning some de-
sign parameters, such as the number, time and quality of inspections. The reliability is assessed making use of
probability boxes, i.e. by accounting for both variability and imprecision. The use of probability boxes relaxes
the assumption of exact input probability distributions, which is always too strong given that these distributions
are very often estimated within a degree of confidence, or elicited from a finite set of experimental data. The
optimization problem is formulated as a time-dependent reliability-based optimization problem, where both
objective and constraint functions require the evaluation of upper and lower reliability bounds. The solution to
this problem represents a real technological challenge, as the reliability assessment by means of p-boxes is a
computationally intensive task, which may take up to few days to be completed on last generation processors. In
this paper, an efficient and generally applicable numerical technique, which is capable of producing a solution
in a very short amount of time (≤ 1 hour), is proposed. The technique combines a forced Monte Carlo simula-
tion method with an optimization strategy, which makes the interval reliability assessment particularly efficient.
The efficiency and accuracy of the proposed technique is shown by means of a literature example involving a
fatigue-prone weld in a bridge girder.
1 INTRODUCTION
Preventive maintenance practice can be extremely
cost-effective for mitigating damage accumulation of
civil infrastructures. In fact, inspection and repair ac-
tivities may prevent loss of serviceability or even
partial collapse. However, making decisions as to
whether and when performing inspections is a very
complex task, especially on real-scale engineering
systems.
The realistic quantification of costs associated to
inspections, repair and failure, requires explicit con-
sideration of the unavoidable uncertainties arising
from the damage-propagation process, and from the
inspection and repair activities. Uncertainties may
come from the inherent variability of the damage-
propagation process or from the lack of available
knowledge about the process itself. P-boxes are used
as a comprehensive mean of representing such het-
erogeneous uncertainties. An uncertainty model de-
fined using p-boxes is quite general and permits to
assess the reliability and sensitivity of the computa-
tional model to the uncertainty propagation. In other
words, the use of p-boxes adds robustness to the reli-
ability analysis making the analyst more aware of the
effects of the uncertainties on the model response.
Within the generalized uncertainty model, the de-
sign of maintenance activities is an optimization prob-
lem that requires the assessment of reliability box.
Reliability-based optimization methods, as described
e.g. in Jensen (2002), are invoked to solve this prob-
lem.
The number, times, and quality of inspections are
the design variables of the optimization, whereas the
total cost and the failure probability are the objective
and constraint functions, respectively. Formulation
and solution to time-dependent reliability-based opti-
mization problems are shown in (Patelli, Valdebenito,
& Schue¨ller 2011) and in (Valdebenito & Schue¨ller
2010a).
In this paper, we propose a general methodology
for the efficient solution of the time-variant reliability-
based maintenance optimization problem, where the
reliability is assessed by means of p-boxes. No restric-
tions in terms of number of inspections and number
of uncertain parameters can be found. The method-
ology is derived from the concept of forced Monte
Carlo simulation, used to evaluate the availability of
plants (Zio & Marseguerra 2002), and it is exploited
to efficiently assess the time-variant reliability condi-
tional to the inspection outcomes, requiring only the
execution of computationally inexpensive functions.
Here, Genetic Algorithms are used to drive the
global optimization, as the cost and constraint func-
tions are stochastic and therefore, no information
about the derivatives can be efficiently used to con-
verge to the minimum. This comes with quite some
more numerical burden, which, however, can be sig-
nificantly alleviated resorting to code parallelization.
2 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT WITH
PROBABILITY BOXES
2.1 Brief introduction to probability boxes
P-boxes extend the definition of reliability to an inter-
val of possible alternatives, enclosed by a lower and
a upper bound. In reliability and risk assessment, p-
boxes are invoked to represent what in literature is
referred to as uncertainty of Type III, which include
both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. Let F and
F be non-decreasing function from the real lineR into
[0,1] and F ≤ F for all x ∈ R. A p-box is the set of
all non-decreasing functions F : R→ [0,1], such that
F (x) ≤ F (x) ≤ F (x).
2.2 P-box convolution by means of Monte Carlo
simulation
A Dempster-Shafer structure can be seen as the ”dis-
crete” equivalent of a p-box and it is key for the reli-
ability assessment of systems. The input-output con-
volution of p-boxes, in practice, is performed by us-
ing Monte Carlo simulation techniques (Kreinovich,
Bernat, Borrett, Mariscal, & Villa 1991). Reliability
assessment is, therefore, performed by i) sampling the
equivalent D-S structure of the p-boxes, ii) obtaining
the output D-S structure, iii) and ultimately estimating
the failure probability bounds.
2.3 Failure probability upper and lower bounds
Let G : Rn→ R be the system performance function,
θ ∈ Rn be a vector of p-boxes, and ΩF be the do-
main of unacceptable states (or failure domain), such
that ΩF = {θ : G(θ) ≤ 0}. The system performance
is evaluated as g = G(θ). Each focal element, θ{s},
of the D-S structure is propagated throughout the sys-
tem, and the corresponding image is obtained as
G(θ{s}) = [g, g]{s}; (1)
where,
g = min
θ∈θ{s}
G(θ); g = max
θ∈θ{s}
G(θ). (2)
The propagation of individual focal elements leads
to the failure probability bounds, obtained using the
plausibility and belief function as
pF = lim
Ns→∞
Ns∑
G(θ{s})∩ΩF 6=Ø
m(G(θ{s})); (3)
pF = lim
Ns→∞
Ns∑
G(θ{s})⊆ΩF
m(G(θ{s})); (4)
where, m is the mass associated to each focal element
of the D-S structure. Note that in Eq. 3 the summation
is extended to all focal elements whose intersection
with the failure domain is not empty, while in Eq.4
the summation is extended to all focal elements that
are entirely contained in the failure domain.
Any distribution function contained within the
bounding CDFs, even not belonging to any parental
distribution model, can be considered for the prob-
lem solution. This implies that the failure probabil-
ity bounds obtained using this approach, are always
wider than those obtained from the parametric ap-
proach, because a greater set of candidates is searched
for. The failure probability bounds are obtained by
computing plausibility and belief of the output D-S
structure as shown in Eq.3 and Eq.4.
One major limitation of this non-parametric ap-
proach, despite its efficiency, is the difficulty in identi-
fying the input distribution functions that are respon-
sible for the failure probability bounds. This issue is
also known in literature as the tracking problem.
3 OPTIMIZATION OF MAINTANENCE COSTS
Two main different classes of costs are considered:
– costs due to inspection and repair, CI +CR,
– costs of failure, CF .
It is assumed that manufacturing costs are determin-
istic as they are linked to construction and usage of
materials. Note that, as pointed out in Valdebenito &
Schue¨ller (2010b), the costs of repair and failure are
obtained as expected values, E[·] as they are obtained
from the estimation of repair and failure probability
respectively.
3.1 Costs due to inspections and repair
The cost due to inspections depends on inspection
quality, q, and on the inspection times, tinsp, and can
be expressed as
CI(q, t
insp) = cI q η(t
insp); (5)
where, cI , is a fixed unit cost, and q (see Eq.7) quanti-
fies the quality of inspections. In the Eq.5 the function
η(t) =
1
(1 + s)t
; (6)
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is a discount function of discount rate, s. Costs due
to repair are present only if repair takes place. Hence
they depend on the probability of repair, pR(q, t). The
probability of repair, is linked to the probability of
detecting the damage within an inspection, POD,
which in turns depends on the inspection quality, q,
the level of damage, D(t), and the technique used to
spot the flaw. For example, in fatigue-prone metallic
components, non-destructive inspection (NDI) tech-
niques can be used. NDI techniques have an associ-
ated probability of detection, which can be modeled
as
POD(t) = (1− p0) (1− e q (f1−f2 D(t))); (7)
where, p0, is the probability of not detecting a large
crack, while f1 and f2 are constants that depend on the
specific NDI technique. The cost of repair can thus be
expressed as
E[CR(q, t
insp)] = cR E[pR(q, t
insp)] η(tinsp); (8)
where, cR is a fixed unit cost, and pR is, clearly, a
function of the inspection times. Note that in some
cases, the unit cost of repair can be very small or
sometimes negligible compared to the cost of inspec-
tion.
3.2 Cost of failure
The cost of failure depends on the quality, q, as well
as on the state of damage, D(t). Here, failure cost can
be expressed as
E[CF (q, t
insp, t)] = cF E[pF (q, t
insp, t)]; (9)
where, cF is a fixed unit cost associated with failure,
partial collapse, or unavailability, and pF (q, tinsp, t) is
the failure probability, calculated as in the next Sec-
tion (see Sec.4). Note that the failure probability de-
pends on both the inspection times, tinsp, and on the
time when the reliability is assessed, t, as it will be
explained in the next section.
3.3 Total cost of maintenance
The total cost of maintenance is
E[CM ] = CI +E[CR] +E[CF ]. (10)
3.4 Formulation of the optimization problem
The maintenance problem can be generally formu-
lated as a constrained optimization problem, where
the constraint represents the limit state safety level
that the system has to comply with. Here, the follow-
ing formulation of the optimization problem is con-
sidered
minimize
q∈R+, tinsp∈[0,TM ]N
E[CM(q, t
insp, t)]
subject to pF (q, tinsp, t) ≤ pcriticF ; (11)
where, pcriticF is determined by a prescribed limit state
safety level. The problem of Eq.11 is addressed using
the penalty function
ψ(c) = 1− eα|min(0,c)|; (12)
which is a function of the constraint
c = − log10
(
pF (q, t
insp, t)
)
+ log10
(
pcriticF
)
; (13)
where, the constraint is satisfied if c > 0. The problem
of Eq.11 can, thus, be reformulated into an equivalent
unconstrained problem, as
minimize
q∈R+, tinsp∈[0,TM ]N
E[CM(q, t
insp, t)] + y ψ(c); (14)
where, y is a penalty factor, which value can be cho-
sen knowing the order of magnitude of the minimum
value of the objective function.
4 EFFICIENT MONTE CARLO STRATEGY
FOR THE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
The present numerical strategy is derived from the
concept of forced MC simulation described in (Zio &
Marseguerra 2002). The strategy is based on the com-
putation of weights, w, which account for the proba-
bility of detection and can be computed at any inspec-
tion time by reusing the results from the same relia-
bility analysis.
4.1 Time-variant reliability and failure probability
assessment
As the system, S(t), evolves in time, so does the level
of damage, D, of specific components. The damage
can be expressed as a function, D =D(θ, t) =Dθ(t),
of some input parameters θ, that can be used to quan-
tify the level of damage. In this paper, damage mani-
fests as fatigue, and the computational model is gov-
erned by the Paris-Erdogan’s law (Paris & Erdogan
1963). Thus, the input vector, θ, includes the initial
crack length, the effective stress range, the shape ra-
tio and any other coefficients of the law. The time-
variant reliability is obtained via definition of a criti-
cal threshold of damage, dthres, as
r(t) = 1− P [Dθ(t) ≥ dthres]; (15)
Both dthres and Dθ(t) are uncertain quantities with as-
sociated probability distribution functions. The time-
variant reliability is obtained as
r(t) = 1−
∫
D(θ,t)≥dthres
h(θ) dθ; (16)
where, h is the joint density function of the ran-
dom vector θ. For simplicity, the capacity dthres has
been included in the input vector, θ. By means of the
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Monte Carlo method the time-variant failure proba-
bility, pF (t), can be calculated as
pF (t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
−∞
I(θ, t) h(θ) dθ; (17)
where, I(θ, t) ∈ {0,1} is the indicator function,
which is 1 only if D(θ, t) ≥ dthres.
4.2 Formulation of the maintenance problem
The maintenance problem requires the evaluation of
the reliability, r(t), over the period of time, t ∈
[0, TM ].
With no inspections (N = 0), the reliability can be
assessed as in Eq.16 and estimated as in Eq.17. When
inspections are considered, i.e. N > 0, the reliabil-
ity of the system is conditional to the inspection out-
comes. The reliability is a function of two different
times: the actual time t, when the reliability is as-
sessed, and the inspection time, tinsp, when the in-
spections are performed. In general, i.e. when N in-
spections are considered, the reliability is given by the
conditional probability,
r(t) = (18)
1− P
[
D(t) ≥ Dthres | tinsp1 < ... < tinspN < t
]
.
The optimal inspection time is naturally between
the following two limiting cases. If inspections are
performed too early, tinsp << TM , nearly no damage
will be found, and hence no repair will take place. As
a consequence the reliability will only be improved
marginally, or even not improved at all. On the other
side, if inspections are done too late, tinsp ' TM , the
probability of detection would be large (because di-
rectly related to the level of damage), but it is likely
that the system will have already failed, thus, the in-
spection will not be effective.
4.2.1 Assumptions
In order to better illustrate the procedure and without
restricting the generality of the approach two simple
assumptions are made:
1. Any inspection is followed by only two out-
comes: either the flaw is detected or not. If a
flaw is detected repair takes place, which ac-
tion is assumed to be perfect, i.e. after repair
D(t > tinsp) = 0.
2. Only preventive maintenance is considered. If
the critical threshold is exceeded at the time of
inspection, the component is not repaired. That
is, if failure has occurred, repair actions will not
take place.
4.2.2 Classification of events and total failure
probability
In order to calculate the reliability as defined in Eq.18,
mutually exclusive events are classified. Among all
four main classes of events are identified:
– the failure event, Fi = [D(t
insp
i ) > D
thres], at the
time of the i-th inspection,
– the failure event, Ft = [D(t) > Dthres], at the
evaluation time t,
– the repair/detection event, Ri = [δ(t
insp
i ) = 1], at
the time of the i-th inspection,
– the eventRi = [δ(t
insp
i ) = 0], i.e. the event of non-
repair/non-detection;
where, δ ∈ {0,1} is a binary random variable to char-
acterize the outcome of inspections, which mass func-
tion is
δ(t) =
{
1 (success) λD(t)
0 (failure) 1− λD(t) ; (19)
where, λD(t) = POD(Dθ(t)) is the likelihood of de-
tecting the flaw during inspection.
The probability of the failure event can be obtained
as
P [F ] = (20)
N+1∑
j=1
P
[
FN−j+2 ∩ (FN−j+1)
] N−j+1∏
k=0
P
[
(Rk)
]
;
where, for simplicity, the summation has been ex-
tended to N + 1 to include the failure event at the
observation time Ft = FN+1.
4.3 An efficient advanced MC simulation approach
An expression for the estimation, by means of MC
simulation, of the failure probability conditional to
the inspection outcomes, is derived from Eq.20 as
pˆF (t) = (21)
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
(
N∑
i=1
(
1−
(
1− δ{s}i
)
I(θ{s}, ti) I(θ{s}, ti+1)
)
i−1∏
k=0
(
1− δ{s}k
)
+ I(θ{s}, t)
N∏
k=1
(
1− δ{s}k
))
.
where, ti = t
insp
i , δi = δ(t
insp
i ), and the indicator func-
tion is
I(θ, t) =
{
1, if Dθ(t) ≥ Dthres
0, otherwise . (22)
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From the expression of Eq.21 follows that a full sim-
ulation needs to be performed any time the inspec-
tion time vector, tinsp, changes, as new inspection out-
comes have to be generated. This limitation can be
removed noting that the expected value of δ(t) equals
the probability of detection
w(t) = E[δ(t)] = (23)
lim
NS→∞
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
δ(t){s} = E[POD (D(θ, t))].
The aforementioned expected value can be used in
Eq.21 as a weight to avoid generating new outcomes
any time a different inspection time is picked. This
will make it possible to use results coming from the
same reliability analysis for every selected inspection
time. This leads to the estimation of the failure prob-
ability as
pˆF (t) = (24)
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
(
N∑
i=1
I(θ{s}, ti)
(
1− (1− wˆi)I(θ{s}, ti+1)
)
i−1∏
k=0
(1− wˆk) + I(θ{s}, t)
N∏
k=1
(1− wˆk)
)
; (25)
where, this time the samples θ{s} are generated once
and for all. An equivalent alternative and more effi-
cient way to compute Eq.24 without the use of a ”for”
loop, over the number of samples NS , is by means of
pˆF (t) = (26)
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
I(θ{s}, t) N∏
j=1
1− wˆj
(
1−I(θ{s}, tj)
) .
4.4 Total and partial probability of repair
By means of the direct approach, the probability of
repair can be calculated for the i-th inspection as
pRi = lim
NS→∞
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
i∏
k=1
δ
{s}
k . (27)
By inverting the order of summation and product se-
quence, the probability of repair for the i-th inspection
can be calculated as
pRi = lim
NS→∞
i∏
k=1
1
NS
NS∑
s=1
δ
{s}
k =
i∏
k=1
wk. (28)
The estimator for the total probability of repair, after
all inspections have been performed, is obtained using
a finite sample set of NS samples as
pˆR =
N∏
k=1
wˆk. (29)
Table 1: Mission time and annual frequency
Value Unit Description
E[ν] 7.5
[
106cycles/year
]
Annual number of cycles
TM 50 [years] Mission time
b
d
a
c
φ
Figure 1: Illustration of structural detail and crack
5 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section a welded connection, taken from Lu-
kic & Cremona (2001), is under consideration. Welds
are particularly weak to damage accumulation as im-
perfections may form and grow under cyclic loading.
The analyzed weld with associated defect is shown in
Fig.1. From the picture it can be appreciated that the
crack propagates from the weld toe towards the bot-
tom mining the integrity of the structural connection.
The crack propagation phenomenon is modelled us-
ing the Paris-Erdogan law, by means of
da
dN
= C (∆K)m ; (30)
where, a is the crack length, N is the number of load-
ing cycles, ∆K is the stress intensity factor range, and
C and m are two material parameters. In this study
no threshold is put on the ∆K values, thus, it is as-
sumed that all loading cycles count on damage. Eq.
30 is solved implicitly by means of numerical inte-
gration. The stress intensity factor range is a function
of the crack length
∆K = Y (a) M(a) ∆S
√
pia; (31)
where, Y (a) is the stress intensity correction factor,
and M(a) is the stress concentration factor, which are
also function of the crack shape, a/c, the flange thick-
ness, b, the flange width w, the weld height, h, and
the weld angle, φ (see e.g. Figure 1). In order to solve
Eq. 30 a target life time (or mission time), TM , of the
structural component has to be selected, as shown in
Table 1. From the rain-flaw histogram (loading anal-
ysis) it is possible to derive the annual number of cy-
cles, ν, which multiplied by the target life time, in
years, provides the total number of cycles at the mis-
sion time. Thus, the number of cycles at the target life
time is Nmax = ν · TM .
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5.0.1 Uncertainties
In this example p-boxes are obtained from given dis-
tribution functions considering their distribution mo-
ments as bounded real intervals. The parental distri-
bution models are defined for all of those inputs that
are known to have a certain distribution, or as Gamma
distribution otherwise. The uncertainty model is con-
structed from the nominal values of mean and stan-
dard deviation of Table 2, by adding increasing levels
of imprecision. The material quantities ln(C) and m
show a strong negative Gaussian correlation, which
is usually close to 0.99. However, the correlation co-
efficient is never a precise number and here it is as-
sumed to range in the following bounded interval
ρ = [−0.995,−0.935]. Here, the relative uncertainty
factor eI ∈ [0,1] defines the level of imprecision for
the uncertain quantities, so, for instance, the bounded
interval of the mean value of quantity i is
µ
i
= [µ˜i (1− eI), µ˜i (1 + eI)]; (32)
where, µ˜i is the central (nominal) mean value of quan-
tity i. In Table 2, the bounded intervals for mean and
standard deviation corresponding to two different lev-
els of imprecision are shown. With the above uncer-
tainty definition, the analyst can relax the assumption
of using exact values for the probability distribution
definition, which is always too strong at this stage of
the analysis. Moreover, by means of uncertainty prop-
agation, it is possible to appreciate the output sensi-
tivity to the amount of uncertainty. This helps recog-
nizing the relative importance of the computational
model parameters on the output uncertainty.
5.1 Failure probability sensitivity
Self-contained measure of global sensitivity can be
extracted from such a general uncertainty model, us-
ing pinching. Here, pinching is performed replacing
the input quantity with a precise distribution function
corresponding to the central values of Table 2. The
sensitivity measure is obtained as
Sθi =
∣∣∣∣1− U(θ∼i)U(θ)
∣∣∣∣ ; (33)
where, U(θ∼i) is the amount of uncertainty outputted
pinching parameter θi, andU(θ) is the total amount of
uncertainty. The procedure is repeated for every input
quantity, pinching the inputs one by one. The amount
of uncertainty is computed as
U(θ∼i) = ln(pF (θ∼i)/pF (θ∼i)). (34)
The global sensitivity analysis was performed choos-
ing 4 different levels of imprecision to better explore
the response of the model to the amount of uncer-
tainty. The analysis led to the results shown in Fig-
ure 2, where clearly the most important input quantity
is the material parameter, m, followed by the stress
range ∆S, the annual number of cycles, ν, and the
material parameter, C.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
se
n
si
tiv
ity
 
 
2% imprecision
3% imprecision
4% imprecision
5% imprecision
a/ca
c
ρmC∆ Sa0ν d b φh
Figure 2: Global sensitivity on the failure probability is obtained
pinging one input at a time
Table 3: Unit cost for the numerical example
Cost Value Description
cI 5000 Unit cost of inspection
cR 500 Unit cost of repair
cF 5 · 105 Unit cost of failure
r 10−3 Discount rate
pthresF 10
−3 Failure probability threshold
5.2 Definition of constraint and cost function
It is recalled that the inspection time vector and the in-
spection quality are the design variables of the prob-
lem. The input unit costs used in this example are re-
ported in Tab.3. In this example the objective is repre-
sented by upper bound cost function. Upper and lower
bounds of the total cost are displayed in Fig.3, as a
function of the first inspection time with fixed inspec-
tion quality, q = 1. From Fig.3, it can be appreciated
the influence of just 1% of imprecision on the solu-
tion of the optimization. For the cost upper bound the
minimum is located at 27 years, while for the lower
bound the minimum is at about 36 years. Equiva-
lently, the failure probability has two different min-
ima, one for the upper and one for the lower bound,
as shown in Fig.4. The constraint is defined so that no
acceptable solution carries a failure probability upper
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
x 104
inspection time [years]
to
ta
l c
os
ts
upper and lower bounds
1% imprecision
Figure 3: Total cost upper and lower bounds define the set of
possible states and candidate solutions
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Table 2: Central values and bounded intervals for the mean and standard deviation of the input p-boxes
P-box Central values Relative uncertainty: eI = 0.05
θi Distribution µ˜i σ˜i µi(5%) σi(5%)
ν
[
106cycles/year
]
Lognormal 7.5 0.5 [7.125, 7.875] [0.475, 0.525]
a0 [mm] Lognormal 0.125 0.045 [0.119, 0.131] [0.043, 0.047]
∆S [MPa] Gamma 7.800 0.100 [7.410, 8.190] [0.095, 0.105]
C∗
[
10−13 mm/cycles
]
Lognormal 2.500 0.923 [2.375, 2.625] [0.877, 0.969]
m∗ Normal 3.000 0.040 [2.850, 3.150] [0.038, 0.042]
af [mm] Gumbel 1.000 0.050 [0.950, 1.050] [0.019, 0.021]
a/c Lognormal 0.400 0.160 [0.380, 0.420] [0.152, 0.168]
d [mm] Gamma 812.0 8.100 [771.4, 852.6] [7.695, 8.505]
b [mm] Gamma 31.60 3.200 [30.02, 33.18] [3.040, 3.360]
h [mm] Gamma 8.400 0.700 [7.980, 8.820] [0.665, 0.735]
φ [deg] Gamma 35.00 2.000 [33.25, 36.75] [1.900, 2.100]
*Correlation: ρ˜ (lnC, m) = −0.99, ρ (lnC, m) = [−0.995, −0.935]
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0.2
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0.7
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1% imprecision
upper and lower bounds
Figure 4: Failure probability upper and lower bounds
bound greater than pthresF = 10
−3.
5.3 Time variant failure probability
The failure probability increases with time as the
damage accumulates. However, performing a number
of inspections increases the reliability over time. Af-
ter inspection, the failure probability keeps increas-
ing, but at a much lower rate, as shown in logarithmic
scale in Fig.5. In order to better appreciate the scale of
failure probability reduction followed by the inspec-
tions, the failure probability curves are also shown in
Fig.6 in normal scale.
5.4 Solution to the cost optimization for scheduling
multiple inspections
Results from the constrained optimization with an in-
creasing number of inspections, are obtained fixing
the critical failure probability to pcriticF = 10
−3, as also
shown in Tab.3. Tab.4 shows that there is no sensible
decrease in the total cost of maintenance, as the num-
ber of inspections increases. However, the optimum
0 5 10 16 20 25 30 36 40 44 50
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
physical time [years]
fa
ilu
re
 p
ro
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bi
lity
 
 
no inspections
3 inspections
5 inspections
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6th inspection
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7th inspection
3rd inspection
Figure 5: Failure probability curves obtained performing 0, 2, 5
and 7 inspections with fixed quality
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Figure 6: Failure probability curves obtained performing 0, 2, 5
and 7 inspections with fixed quality
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Table 4: Minimum total costs and corresponding candidate optimum as the number of inspections increases for the case pthresF = 10
−3
N pˆF min CM q∗ tinsp∗ [years]
4 5 10−1 3.27 105 0.8 {20,26,28,29}
5 10−3 3.86 106 88.6 {0.5,7,14,20,30}
7 10−3 3.74 106 62.0 {0.02,4.5,9,14,20,27,35}
9 10−3 3.68 106 47.5 {0.02,2,7,11,14,19,24,29,36}
12 10−3 3.82 106 37.9 {0.02,1.5,4.5,9,11,18,22,26,32,37,45}
15 10−3 3.82 106 30.3 {0.02,0.5,4,7,9,11,14,16,19,23,25,29,34,39,46}
* Candidate optima
quality decreases, which means that, at the same to-
tal cost, less expensive inspection techniques could be
used. Clearly, performing 4 inspections in this case is
not enough to meet the safety constraint requirement,
as the failure probability is too big, pˆF = 0.5 > 10−3,
in this case. The last two columns of Tab.4 report
the solution of the stochastic optimization problem, in
terms of inspection quality and inspection time vector.
6 CONCLUSIONS
A general and efficient methodology for the schedul-
ing of multiple inspections has been presented. The
maintenance of a system is a challenging engineering
task, where the estimation of costs requires the con-
sideration of heterogeneous uncertainties arising from
the damage propagation process and from the inspec-
tion/repair activities. The methodology makes use of
the concept of forced MC simulation to maximize the
efficiency, without reducing the accuracy. The effi-
ciency of the MC strategy has permitted to go be-
yond the classical probabilistic modeling of the uncer-
tainties. The proposed strategy is capable of assessing
the failure probability upper and lower bounds, when
imprecision is defined in the input probability distri-
butions. In other words, the proposed strategy allows
for the definition of the input uncertainties by means
of p-boxes, which generalize the concept of proba-
bility distribution to include every probability distri-
bution within the two bounding CDFs. In terms of
computational cost, only two full reliability analyses
are required to assess upper and lower bound at any
given time and for any number of inspections. The ef-
ficiency, scalability and applicability of the proposed
methodology has been demonstrated via an example
involving 12 variables. In the example, the advantage
of using such a generalized uncertainty model has
clearly emerged, as it has been also possible to obtain
sensitivity measures on the failure probability, with-
out any additional computational costs. As a future
direction, this work can be extended to include inter-
val design variables to see how the uncertainty affects
the bounds of the minimum cost.
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